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LESTER RALPH ROMERO and 
1\'l:\XINE ROMERO, his wife, 
Pla·i nti.ffs and Appellants. 
vs. 
VICTOR SCHMIDT and RAE SCHMIDT, 
his wife; TOM B. WILCOX and 
MRS. TOl\II WILCOX, his wife; and 
MR. ART CASEY and MARIE CASEY, 
his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
No. 9922 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Action to foreclose real estate contract as note and 
mortgage. Respondents allege tender and estoppel as a 
defense. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
All elements necessary to prove Plaintiffs' and Appel-
lants' case were admitted and the defenses alleged were 
tried b~· the court sitting as a court of equity with an 
advisory jury. Judgment of no cause of action was entered 
against Plaintiffs and Appellants on the theories of tender 
and equitable estoppel. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs and Appellants seek an order vacating the 
judgment of no cause of action and directing the District 
Court to enter judgment for foreclosure of the mortgage 
and a reasonable attorneys' fee for services in connection 
with the trial and this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants sold a residence to respondents Schmidt, 
July 17, 1961 (R. 100-101), on a uniform real estate con-
tract (Ex. 1-P) with a $45.00 down payment (R. 100). 
Romeros demanded and received payments promptly for 
13 months, to and including the August 1, 1962 payment, 
at which time Schmidts sold the residence to Respondent 
Wilcox (R. 173-174), who assumed and agreed to pay 
the balance due on the Schmidt-Romero contract (Ex. 
1-P; R. 179, L. 19-22). Appellants were not contacted 
concerning the sale to Wilcox or the balance due on the 
contract in connection with that sale. 
Respondents Wilcox entered into an agreement with 
Respondents Casey for the sale of the residence to 
Caseys (Ex. 3-P). Wilcox and his partner, Glavas (R. 
109), contacted Appellant Romero andjor Romeros' as-
sociate, Taylor, several times concerning the unpaid 
balance due on the residence (R. 110-118; R. 147-151; R. 
156-159), and Romero was also contacted by Wallace, the 
real estate agent handling the sale between Wilcox and 
Caseys (R. 131-133); however, the parties did not reach 
an agreement as to the unpaid balance due on the con-
tract. 
About September 19-20, 1962, during a meeting with 
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Wilcox and Glavis (R. 156; R. 110), Romero stated that 
the September 1, 1962 payment was delinquent, at which 
time Wilcox made an unqualified promise to pay before 
the end of the 30-day grace period (R. 164, L. 20-30, R. 
165, L. 1-2). Wilcox actually paid the September 1, 1962 
puyment within the grace period by delivering a check 
(Ex. 2-P) to Romero's office about September 29, 1962, 
which check was returned marked "Insufficient Funds" 
about October 18, 1962 (R. 101, L. 24-30). About October 
15, 1962, prior to the time when the September check was 
returned, Romero stated to Wilcox's realtor that the 
October 1, 1962 payment had not been made (R. 161, L. 
~1-25). On October 24, 1962, Romeros caused a notice 
tR. 9-10) to be served upon the Respondents (R. 102, L. 
3-17) wherein Romeros elected, under the provisions of 
paragraph 16C of the real estate contract (Ex. 1-P), to 
treat said contract as a note and mortgage, to declare the 
entire unpaid balance on said contract to be immediately 
due and payable (R. 9-10). Payment was not made, thus 
on January 8, 1963, Romeros commenced this action for 
foreclosure. 
Respondents admit that the September 1, 1962 payment 
was not made within the grace period, that Romeros 
elected to treat the contract as a note and mortgage and 
served notice upon them declaring the contract balance 
all immediately due and that payment of the balance 
due on the contract was not made. Based upon the 
stipulations of fact, Appellants established a prima-facie 
case. The only issues are the defenses of tender and of 
equitable estoppel asserted by the Respondents. 
There is little dispute about the facts, except as to the 
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content of the conversation between Romero and Wallace 
' and even Wallace's version of the conversation does not 
aid Respondents in either of their defenses, as indicated 
more fully in the discussion under the specific points. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS DID NOT MAKE A LEGAL TEN-
DER OF DELINQUENT PAYMENT PRIOR TO AC-
CELERATION OF BALANCE DUE AND APPEL-
LANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A FORECLOSURE 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The word "Tender" is defined as an unconditional offer 
of payment, coupled with a present ability to do so, and 
consists of the actual production and offer to pay, in 
current coin of the realm, at the time and place specified 
in the contract, of a sum not less than the amount due 
on a specific debt or obligation (Somerton State Bank v. 
Maxey, 22 Ariz. 365, 197 P. 892, 14 ALR 1117; Walker v. 
Houston, 215 Cal. 742, 12 P.2d 952, 87 ALR 937; Equitable 
Life Assur. Soc. v. Boothe, 170 Or. 79, 86 P.2d 960; 52 
Am. Jur. Tender Sec. 2). 
Respondents alleged and the court found (R. 83, Par. 3) 
that plaintiffs' right to declare the entire balance due was 
cut off by reason of an alleged tender, to Appellants, of 
delinquent payments prior to the service, by Appellants, 
of the notice declaring the entire contract balance im-
mediately due and payable (R. 9-10). The advisory jury 
in this equitable action (R. 184) was given instructions 
as to the meaning of "Tender" (R. 78) and answered 
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special interrogatories to the effect that a tender of all 
delinquent payments was made to Romeros (R. 80, Par. 3 
and 4); however, said interrogatories failed to inquire 
whether the alleged "tender" occurred after or before the 
notice which declared the contract balance due. Tenders 
of delinquent installments (R. 33, Par. 5) were made 
by the Respondents after said notice (R. 9-10) was served, 
however, those tenders were made too late. The only 
effect of a tender after maturity is to prevent the acquisi-
tion of any further rights on the part of the creditor and 
not to deprive him of rights acquired prior to that time. 
(McClellan v. Davis, 45 Idaho 541, 263 P. 1002; Anno: 
15 LRA(NS) 1165.) It is likely that the jury answered 
this interrogatory on the basis of tenders made after 
October 24, 1963, and since tenders after that date are 
wholly immaterial to the issues in the case, the answer of 
the jury to interrogatories concerning tender (R. 80) are 
unreliable and should be disregarded. The definition given 
to the jury by the court as to the meaning of "tender" (R. 
78) is improper, since it would permit the jury to find that 
a "tender" was made by" ... an offer to pay, ... " whereas 
a legal "tender" requires far more than an "offer to pay." 
It is uncontroverted that the September 1, 1962 pay-
ment was made September 29, 1962 by a personal check 
(Ex. 2-P), which was dishonored by the bank and re-
turned about October 18, 1962, marked "Insufficient 
Funds'' (R. 101, L. 24-30), and that the notice declaring 
the balance due was served October 24, 1962 (R. 102, L. 
3-17). The only indication of any "offer to pay" prior to 
the service of the notice on October 24, 1962, is the state-
ment allegedly made to Romero by Wallace, the Realtor-
which statement Romero testified was not made (R. 161, 
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L. 17-20) -to the effect that Caseys' funds were available 
in Wallace's trust account from which any delinquency 
that existed could be paid at any time that Romero veri-
fied the unpaid contract balance to be assumed by Caseys 
and the Wilcox-Casey sale was closed (R. 133-135). 
Wallace, as a realtor hoping to earn a commission, was 
an interested party to the Casey-Wilcox transaction, and 
his testimony should be weighed with that in mind. It is 
impossible for him to have made a tender concerning the 
September, 1962 payment, which is the default upon 
which this action is made, since the conversation with 
Romero during which the alleged "tender" occurred was 
October 15, 1962 (R. 131, R. 159-160) -the check for the 
September payment (Ex. 2-P) was not returned until 
three days later on October 18, 1962 (R. 106, L. 21-30, R. 
107, L. 1-9). The statement by Wallace that " ... I believe 
he did tell me at that time that there was a check given 
him for that $89.00 that was returned, ... " (R. 141, L. 15-
17) is obviously in error and is contrary to his prior 
testimony in which he stated that Romero did not indi-
cate to him in what manner Respondents were in default 
and that Wallace knew nothing about the check that was 
issued and later dishonored (R. 141, L. 2-8). Romero 
testified (R. 163, L. 10-14) that he could not have told 
Wallace that he was going to foreclose as alleged by 
Wallace (R. 133, L. 5-9) since he, at that time, had no 
know ledge concerning the dishonor of the check for the 
September payment (Ex. 2-P). Romero's testimony is 
uncontroverted that he had no conversations with Wal-
lace, Wilcox or Glavas after the check (Ex. 2-P) was 
returned and that he immediately took it to the office of 
his attorney (R. 161, L. 26-30, R. 162, L. 1-3). Romero 
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testified (R. 162, L. 4-7) that no one ever tendered to him 
the amount of money necessary to cover the dishonored 
check (Ex. 2-P) before service of the notice declaring the 
balance of the contract due (R. 9-10). Wallace testified 
that he never offered or handed any money to Romeros 
(R. 139, L. 30; R. 140, L. 1-6); that he could not offer or 
hand the money to Romeros (R. 140, L. 4); that there 
were no funds in his trust account for Romeros (R. 140, L. 
17-19); that all funds in his trust account were held for 
payment to Wilcox (R. 140, L. 14-15); that the funds held 
by him were paid to him by Caseys with authority tore-
lease the money only after a correct contract balance was 
determined, which they could assume, and after the trans-
action between Wilcox and Caseys was closed (R. 135, 
L. 17-22; R. 136, L. 19-25). The money which was alleg-
edly "tendered" was still the property of Caseys and who 
had not authorized a tender of that money to Romeros, 
as shown by the above quoted testimony of Wallace, and 
accordingly that money was not available for Wallace to 
tender to Romeros on behalf of Wilcox, as urged by Mr. 
Hoggan (R. 135, L. 5-12). A tender cannot be made of 
funds which are not the debtor's to tender and in which 
he has then no property (Vernon Center State Bank v. 
Mangelsen, 166 Minn. 472, 208 NW 186, 48 ALR 710). The 
present ability to make a strict tender is essential to a 
\'alid tender (Somerton State Bank v. Maxey, supra). It 
is not sufficient that a person is present from whom the 
money might be borrowed, unless he actually consents to 
loan it for the purpose of the tender (Vernon Center State 
Bank v. Mangelson, supra), which tender was expressly 
forbidden under the authority given to Wallace by Caseys 
(R. 135, L. 17-22; R. 136, L. 19-25). A person making a 
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written tender of money in accordance with 78-27-1, UCA, 
1953, quoted below, which excuses the actual production 
of the money if the tender is in writing, must act in good 
faith and have the ability to produce the money for the 
tender to be valid (Hyams v. Bamberger, 10 U. 3, 10; 36 P. 
202) , and under the facts in our case, even if the alleged 
tender by Wallace had been in writing it would have been 
insufficient because he had no authority to tender the 
money in his possession at that time as indicated above. 
A mere offer to pay does not constitute a valid tender 
(Talty v. Freedman's Sav. & T. Co. 93 US 321, 23 L ed 
886; Somerton State Bank v. Maxey, supra) and accord-
ingly even without the conditions attached by Wallace in 
his alleged tender, his acts and statements (discussed 
above) would be insufficient to constitute a valid tender. 
A tender requires the physical act of offering the money 
or thing to be tendered, and this cannot rest on implica-
tion alone. The law requires an actual, present, physical 
offer; it is not satisfied by a mere spoken offer to pay, 
which, although indicative of present possession of money 
and intention to produce it, is unaccompanied by any 
visible manifestation of intention to make the offer good 
(Peugh v. Davis, 113 US 542, 28 Led 1127, 5 Sup. Ct. 622; 
Somerton State Bank v. Maxey, supra; Wooten v. Dahl-
quist, 42 Idaho 121, 244 P. 407; 52 Am. Jur. Tender 
Sec. 7). Mr. Hoggan's position throughout the case 
has been that a legal tender was made when Wallace 
stated that payment of delinquencies would be made if 
Romero first determined and agreed with the defendants 
as to the correct contract balance (R. 135, L. 8-12; R. 33, 
Par. 3; R. 41, Par. 3; R. 188, L. 29-30; R. 189, L. 1-6). Even 
if defendants complied with all other requirements of a 
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valid tender (which we deny), the alleged tender was 
expressly conditional upon Romeros first performing cer-
tain acts and making certain agreements, which Romeros 
had no legal obligation to do under the terms of their 
contract with Schmidts (Ex. 1-P). Romeros were not 
parties to the Wilcox-Casey transaction, and had no duties 
or obligations with respect to that transaction. Romeros' 
only obligation was to convey title to the property when 
the full purchase price had been paid. Romeros demanded 
payment of the full purchase price (R. 9-10), but it was 
not paid, therefore the duty to convey did not arise. 
The delivery of the dishonored check (Ex. 2-P) did not 
constitute a tender (Sieverts v. White, 2 U.2d 351, 273 
P.2d 974, 975). 78-27-1, UCA, 1953, reads as follows: 
"An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money 
or to deliver a written instrument or specific personal 
property, is, if not accepted, equivalent to the actual 
production and tender of the money, instrument or 
property." (Emphasis added.) 
This statute creates an exception in the case of written 
tenders, to the common law rule which requires the 
actual production and offer of the money. No written 
tender was made in our case, and, accordingly, under this 
statute, the Respondents were required to actually pro-
duce and tender the money to constitute a legal tender, 
which they clearly failed to do. The law requires that the 
tenderer have the money present and ready, and that he 
produce and actually offer it to the other party. (Somer-
ton State Bank v. Maxey, supra; Anno: 33 LRA 234.) The 
money must be actually shown to the person to whom it 
is tendered (Peugh v. Davis, supra), and some courts 
have attached much importance to this, on the theory that 
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the sight of the money might be highly persuasive in 
tempting the creditor to accept (Finch v. Brook, 1 Bing 
NC 253, 131 Eng. Reprint 1114, 6 Eng. Rul Cas 591). 
The conditions discussed above, which were attached to 
the alleged tender, were not conditions upon which the 
Respondents had a right to insist under the contractural 
relationship between Appellants and Respondents, and 
accordingly, even if the alleged tender were otherwise 
sufficient, the conditions attached thereto would render it 
ineffective. (Sieverts v. White, supra; Bohler v. Callaway, 
267 US 479, 69 L ed 745, 45 S Ct 431; Queensboro Nat. 
Bank v. Kelly (CCA 2d) 48 F2d 574, 87 ALR 1172, writ of 
certiorari denied in 284 US 620, 76 L ed 529, 52 S Ct 9; 
Bellamah v. Schmider, 68 NM 247, 360 P.2d 656; 52 Am. 
Jur. Tender Sec. 24.) 
Mr. Hoggan has at all times acknowledged that the 
alleged "tender" by Wallace was conditional (R. 33, Par. 
3; R. 41, Par. 3; R. 135, L. 8-12; R. 188, L. 29-30; R. 180, 
L. 1-6) and could not be otherwise, for the alleged reason 
that information concerning the unpaid balance was re-
quired before an unconditional tender could be made, 
which information was allegedly in the exclusive posses-
sion of the Appellants (R. 189); however, this assertion is 
contrary to the facts since only 13 payments had been 
made on the contract (R. 122, L. 11-15); there was no dis-
agreement as to the original balance (R. 121, L. 8-16), the 
interest rate (R. 121, L. 16-19), the dates and amounts of 
the payments made on the contract (R. 120-121), the 
insurance costs to be added and the small difference con-
cerning taxes was readily resolved by the parties (R. 121-
122). Glavis and Wallace had computed such balances on 
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contracts many times and could make such a computation 
easily (R. 122, L. 11-15; R. 137, L. 25-28), and accordingly 
the determination of an accurate balance was a simple 
mathematical computation which the Respondents could 
have easily made. No information concerning the contract 
was within the exclusive knowledge of Appellants, and 
Appellants had no duty, under the terms of his contract 
(Ex. 1-P), to make the mathematical computation and to 
enter into an agreement that the balance thus determined 
was correct. Respondents' obligation to pay $89.00 per 
month to Appellants within the time specified in the con-
tract (Ex. 1-P) is clear and unambiguous and has no 
relataionship to a possible sale between Wilcox and 
Caseys, or the desire of the Respondents to determine an 
accurate unpaid balance due on the contract as of a 
specific time. The parties expressly contracted and agreed 
that time was of the essence in the contract (Ex. 1-P, Par. 
17), and such a stipulation is binding upon the courts of 
equity (Cheney v. Libby, 134 US 68, 33 Led 818, 10 S. Ct. 
498; Anno: 79 ALR 1231). The court should enforce the 
clear intention of the parties as expressed by the written 
contract. (Forrester v. Cook, 77 U 137, 292 P. 206; Burt v. 
Stringfellow, 45 U. 207, 143 P. 234; Udy v. Jensen, 63 U. 
94, 222 P. 597; Peck v. Judd, 7 U. 2d 420.) 
Clearly the Court erred in holding that Respondents 
had tendered the delinquent September, 1962 installment 
to Appellants prior to the service of the notice declaring 
the entire unpaid balance to be immediately due and 
payable, and accordingly the judgment of the District 
Court should be reversed and a decree of foreclosure 
entered in favor of Appellants and against Respondents. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ESTOPPED BY THEIR 
ACTS OR OMMISSIONS TO EXERCISE THE ACCEL-
ERATION CLAUSE OF THE CONTRACT AND FIND-
INGS OF COURT WITH RESPECT TO ESTOPPEL 
ARE NOT WITHIN THE ISSUES OF THE CASE. 
Respondents allege equitable estoppel as a defense and 
asked the Court of Equity to relieve them from the effect 
of the operative acceleration clause contained in the 
contract (Ex. 1-P, Par. 16C), which acceleration clause 
was exercised by Appellants (R. 9-10; R. 102) after the 
check issued September 29, 1962, by Respondent Wilcox 
(Ex. 2-P) in payment of the September 1, 1962, install-
ment due on said contract, was dishonored by the bank 
and returned marked "Insufficient Funds" on October 18, 
1962, which was 18 days after the expiration of the 30-day 
grace period allowed by the contract (Ex. 1-P, Par. 16; 
R. 101, L. 24-30). Respondents' theory as shown by the 
Findings of Fact (R. 82-84) seems to be that Mr. Romero's 
misrepresentations, actions and conduct in failing to 
determine and agree upon a correct contract balance, 
allegedly MISLED Respondents to their detriment, PRE-
VENTED Respondents from making their September 1, 
1962 contract payment to Appellants and thus CAUSED 
the September 1, 1962, payment not to be paid within the 
grace period and thus CAUSED that delinquency, which 
is the delinquency relied upon by Appellants in exercising 
the acceleration clause that declared the entire contract 
balance to be immediately due and payable (R. 33, Par. 3; 
R. 41, Par. 3; R. 51, Par. 2; R. 83, Par. 4 through 11; 
R. 189). 
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RESPONDENTS' POSITION IS WHOLLY WITHOUT 
MERIT OR CANDOR. The sole and proximate cause of 
non-payment of the September 1, 1962 contract payment 
was "INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" in the bank account (Ex. 
2-P). No acts or omissions of Appellants CAUSED that 
check to be dishonored. 
The Court awarded judgment of no cause of action (R. 
86) against Appellants on their foreclosure action on the 
theories of tender (discussed under Point I above) and on 
the theory of equitable estoppel, however, the Findings of 
Fact (R. 82-84) entered as a part of and in support of that 
judgment go far beyond the findings of the advisory jury 
(R. 80) used in this equitable action (R. 184) or the 
decision announced by the Judge in open Court, and the 
findings and issues contained therein are, for the most 
part, wholly unsupported by the issues raised in the 
pleadings (R. 32-34; R. 40-42), the issues specified for 
trial in this matter by the pre-trial order (R. 50-52) or 
which were actually tried or litigated before the Court 
during the trial of this case. 
The only issue raised by the Respondents concerning 
equitable estoppel in their answers (R. 33, Par. 3; R. 41, 
Par. 3) and in the pre-trial order (R. 51, Par. 2) is the 
allegation that Appellants failed and refused to verify the 
contract balance to facilitate closing of the sale of the 
residence by Wilcox to Caseys. Respondents waived their 
right to raise additional defenses by not asserting those 
defenses in their answer as required by Rule 12 (b), 
URCP. Rule 12(h), URCP, pertaining to waiver of de-
fenses, reads in part as follows: 
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"WAIVER OF DEFENSES. A party waives all de-
fenses and objections which he does not present 
either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he 
has made no motion, in his answer or reply, ex-
cept ... " 
The pre-trial order (R. 51, Par. 2) made in this case 
limited the estoppel issue to the question of whether: 
"2. Plaintiffs are estopped from claiming failure to 
pay within the time allowed by reason of their own 
failure to verify the contract balance on the Schmidt-
Romero contract to facilitate the Wilcox-Casey clos-
ing.'' (Emphasis added.) 
The pre-trial order required that "Any objections to this 
pre-trial order must be filed within one week from date 
hereof." No objections were filed by Respondents, and, in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 16, URCP, that 
order controlled the subsequent course of the action and 
limited the issues to be tried to those specified by the 
pre-trial order. The Court erred in including findings 
involving new issues concerning estoppel in its Findings 
of Fact (R. 82-84), which were outside the scope of the 
issues to be tried in this case as specified by the pleadings 
and pre-trial order and which findings are, for the most 
part, wholly unsupported by any evidence received in 
this case. 
Since the matters tried to the Court were equitable and 
the jury was only advisory (R. 80), the appeal in this 
case is as to both the law and fact (Rule 72(a), URCP), 
and the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the findings may be raised on appeal (Rule 52 (b), 
URCP). 
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The decision of the District Court also should be re-
versed because the findings prepared by Respondents and 
signed by the court do not respond to and are not in 
conformity with the issues (Giauque v. Salt Lake City, 
42 U. 89, 129 P. 429) , go far beyond the findings of the 
advisory jury (R. 80) in this equitable action (R. 184) or 
the decision announced by Judge Faux in open Court, the 
findings are made without the issues, and there is no 
evidence to support them. (In re Evans, 42 U. 282, 314, 
130 P. 217; Hathaway v. United Tintic Mines Co., 42 U. 
520, 132 P. 338; Greenhalgh v. United Tintic Mines Co., 
42 U. 524, 132 P. 390; Brittain v. Gorman, 42 U. 586, 133 
P. 370; Skeen v. Van Sickle, 71 U. 577, 268 P. 562; Thomas 
v. Farrell, 82 U. 535, 26 P.2d 328; Parowan Mercantile Co. 
v. Gurr, 83 U. 436, 30 P.2d 207; Pieper v. Hatch, 86 U. 292, 
43 P.2d 700.) 
Said Findings of Fact are also objectionable for the 
further reason that said findings are findings of fraud and 
misrepresentation, and the provisions of Rule 9 (b), 
URCP, pertaining to pleading fraud was not observed by 
Respondents, which rule reads in part as follows: 
"Rule 9(b) FRAUD, MISTAKE, CONDITION OF 
THE MIND. In all averments of fraud or mistake, 
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall 
be stated with particularity ... " (Emphasis added.) 
The purpose of this rule is to require the pleader to 
specify the particular acts, representations and conduct 
alleged to be fraudulent, and to require the pleader to 
show the materiality of the representations with particu-
larity. (Davis Stock Co. v. Hill, 2 U.2d 20, 268 P.2d 988, 
989; Heathman v. Hatch, 13 U.2d 266, 372 P.2d 990; Heath-
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man v. Fabian, 14 U.2d 60,377 P.2d 189.) Respondents not 
only failed to aver the circumstances constituting fraud 
or mistake with particularity, but failed to aver fraud 
at all. 
The Court erroniously instructed the advisory equity 
jury that the burden of proof required was a " ... pre-
ponderance of the evidence ... " (R. 74) whereas since its 
findings are of fraud, the instructions should have clearly 
specified that evidence must be proved by "clear and 
convincing'' proof. 
Appellants were not advised by the pleadings, evidence 
or pre-trial order that fraud and misrepresentation were 
issues in the case, and, accordingly, no objection was 
made to that instruction. Since the jury was merely 
advisory (R. 80) in accordance with the provisions of 
Rule 39 (c), URCP, and this action is equitable, the failure 
to object to that instruction is immaterial to the right of 
the Appellants to raise the question of the propriety of 
that instruction on appeal (Rule 72(a), URCP), and the 
Court is not bound by the finding of the jury (Smith v. 
Richardson, 2 U. 424). 
The Findings of Fact concerning alleged false and 
fraudulent representations by Appellants and which are 
objectionable for the many reasons specified above are as 
follows: 
(a) That Appellants misrepresented the unpaid bal-
ance due on the contract (R. 83, Par. 5). 
(b) That Respondents were misled by Appellants' con-
duct to believe that Appellants would cooperate in arriv-
ing at a correct contract balance (R. 83, Par. 5). 
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(c) That Appellants intended that Respondents would 
rely upon the false representations concerning the con-
tract balance (R. 83, Par. 6). 
(d) That the Appellants knew or should have known 
that their representations concerning the contract bal-
ance were false (R. 83, Par. 7). 
(e) That Respondents relied upon Appellants' repre-
sentations that Appellants would attempt to work out a 
correct balance (R. 84, Par. 9). 
(f) That the reliance prejudiced Respondents (R. 84, 
Par. 11). 
(g) That the Respondents failed to make payments 
due on the contract pending clarification of the contract 
balance and in reliance upon the alleged representations 
by Appellants that they would attempt to work out a 
correct contract balance (R. 84, Par. 10). 
A cursory examination of the foregoing findings shows 
clearly that they are founded upon the theory of fraud 
and misrepresentation rather than upon the theory of 
estoppel allegedly arising from a simple " ... failure to 
verify the contract balance ... " which was the only issue 
concerning estoppel which was an issue in the case as 
shown by the pre-trial order (R. 51, Par. 3). The decision 
of the Court is based upon findings of fraud and misrep-
resentation which were not issues in this case, and 
accordingly the decision should be reversed. 
The foregoing findings are unsupported by the evi-
dence. Findings (a), (c) and (d) above, to the effect that 
Appellants willfully and intentionally misrepresented the 
unpaid contract balance are wholly untrue. The Court 
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made no finding that the Respondents relied upon these 
representations or changed their position in reliance 
thereon, and accordingly said findings are irrelevent and 
immaterial to the issues in this case. 
Appellants had several conversations with Respondents 
concerning the unpaid contract balance, various balances 
were discussed and some errorts were corrected, how-
ever, Respondents were informed at that time that the 
balances might be incorrect (R. 149, L. 11-18; R. 155; R. 
117) ; that the balances mentioned by Respondents as the 
contract balance might be entirely correct (R. 149, L. 11-
18) and that the balances furnished had been computed 
by a third party and had not been examined by Appel-
lants for accuracy (R. 167). Respondents at all times 
objected to the contract balances mentioned by Appel-
lants (R. 111; R. 113-118; R. 130-135; R. 155) and claimed 
that they were unable to close the Wilcox-Casey sale 
because they were never furnished with a contract bal-
ance with which they were satisfied (R. 51, Par. 2). Cer-
tainly Respondents were not justified in relying upon 
said information, and in fact did not rely thereon. 
Respondents claimed throughout the case that Appel-
lants were mean, uncooperative, abusive (R. 175, L. 22-
30; R. 176, L. 176, L. 1-13; R. 140, L. 20-30; R. 141, L. 1-3; 
R. 131-132); that Appellants refused to furnish a contract 
balance which Respondents could use to close the Wilcox-
Casey sale (R. 133, L. 5-9) and that 9 days before service 
of the notice accelerating the contract balance (R. 9-10) 
Appellants warned Respondents that they were going to 
foreclose the contract (R. 140, L. 20-30; R. 141, L. 1-3; 
R. 132-133). 
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The Court observed the inconsistency between the 
testimony of Respondents and the claim of estoppel and 
the obvious fact that if Appellants' conduct was as 
portrayed by Respondents, they could have not been 
misled thereby (R. 179), however, the Court apparently 
overlooked this obvious fact in reaching its decision. 
Findings (b), (e) and (f) above, to the effect that 
Respondents were misled and prejudiced by their reliance 
upon Appellants' representations that they would attempt 
to work out a correct balance and cooperate in arriving 
at a correct balance is also untrue. Appellants actually 
attempted to compute a contract balance and prepared a 
schedule which attempted to allocate the various pay-
ments between principal, interest, taxes, etc. and to de-
termine the unpaid balance after each payment (Ex. 5-P), 
which schedule and the information thereon was made 
available to Respondents R. 114; R. 120;..122; R. 146-151); 
however, Respondents failed to take the time to work 
out their own schedule of payments and contract balance, 
although they could easily have done so since all neces-
sary information was available to them (R. 120-123; R. 
137, L. 25-28) , or to compare their figures in detail with 
the schedule prepared by Appellants (Ex. 5-P). The 
obligation to make payments of $89.00 per month was not 
contingent in any manner upon ascertaining the unpaid 
balance due on the contract (Ex. 1-P) or upon the com-
pletion of the proposed sale between Respondents Casey 
and Wilcox, a transaction unrelated to Appellants. 
The lack of candor of Respondents' argument is illus-
trated by the fact that Wilcox was able to ascertain the 
balance due on the contract (Ex. 1-P) with sufficient 
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accuracy to permit him to purchase from Schmidts, but 
then before even one more payment was made, he argues 
that he was unable to ascertain the contract balance with 
sufficient accuracy to sell the same property to Caseys, 
even though the same information concerning the con-
tract, dates and amounts of payments thereon, taxes and 
insurance to be added, etc. was available to him as to 
Appellants. 
Equitable estoppel requires misleading conduct or lan-
guage of one person and reliance thereon by another who 
is misled thereby to his prejudice (Glendale v. Coquat, 
46 Ariz. 478, 52 P.2d 1178, 102 ALR 837; Sovereign Camp 
W. W. v. Newsom, 142 Ark. 132, 219 SW 759, 14 ALR 903; 
10 Am Jur Estoppel 36, P. 637; 70 ALR 994; 36 Am Jur 
Mortgages 387, 398). Respondents' proposed jury instruc-
tion No. 11 (R. 70) correctly recites the rule of law that 
estoppel requires that the default be caused by the acts 
or conduct of the person to be estopped, as where he has 
wrongfully prevented payment. (Quoted from 36 Am Jur 
Mtgs 398, P. 886-887.) The only thing that prevented the 
September, 1962 payment from being made on time and 
caused the default is lack of funds in Respondent Wilcox's 
bank account, a matter over which Appellants had no 
control. 
The Court found (R. 83, Par. 4) that the default of 
Respondents " ... was the result of unconcionable and 
inequitable conduct of the Plaintiffs" (Appellants). The 
Court failed to state what conduct of Appellants was 
"unconcionable" or "inequitable," and accordingly this 
finding, particularly in view of the lack of evidence to 
that effect as demonstrated above, and the fact that the 
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actual cause of the default was the returned check, is not 
sufficient to support the judgment of the Court. 
The Court found (R. 83, Par. 8) that the Respondents 
did not know the balance owing to Appellants on the 
contract (Ex. 1-P) and that without an agreement from 
Appellants as to the amount of that balance could not be 
required to assume the balance owing to Appellants. This 
finding assumes that Appellants had a duty to supply the 
contract balance to Wilcox (with whom Appellants had 
no contract or agreement) and that the assumption of the 
contract balance due to Appellants (Ex. 1-P) was a con-
dition precedent to the obligation of the Respondents to 
make further payments to Appellants. The rights of 
Appellants and the duties of Schmidt and all of the 
Respondents who might undertake to assume and to 
perform Schmidts' obligations thereunder, are fully de-
fined in the real estate contract (Ex. 1-P), clearly indicate 
that Appellants have a right to collect $89.00 per month 
and a duty to convey title when the contract is paid in 
full. Until the last payment is due the obligation of 
Respondents to pay the monthly installments is uncondi-
tional and there is no duty for Appellants to ascertain 
the exact unpaid contract balance (55 Am Jur 106, Page 
582). 
The Court found that Appellants gave Respondents no 
notice of default and did not make demand for payment 
of delinquencies due on the real estate contract (Ex. 1-P) 
before serving notice upon Respondents, declaring the 
entire contract balance due and payable (R. 84, Par. 12). 
This finding is wholly irrelevent and immaterial to the 
issues in this case. Appellants exercised the right con-
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ferred upon them by the contract (Ex. 1-P, Par. 16C) to 
accelerate the contract balance without notice, and the 
Court should enforce the clear intention of the parties as 
expressed by the written contract (Forrester v. Cook, 
supra; Burt v. Stringfellow, supra; Udy v. Jensen, supra). 
The Legislature has expressly approved acceleration 
clauses in notes ( 44-1-2 (3), UCA, 1953), and the holder 
of a note is not required to give notice of election to 
declare the note due as a condition precedent to bringing 
action for its collection (Thomas v. Foulger, 71 U. 274, 
282, 264 P. 975). Presentment for payment is not neces-
sary in order to charge the person primarily liable on an 
instrument ( 44-1-71, UCA, 1953). Appellants actually 
gave notice declaring the balance due (R. 9-10) and 
waited 76 days, before commencing this action, to give 
the Respondents an opportunity to refinance or to make 
other arrangements to pay the contract balance. If action 
can be commenced without notice, clearly notice of de-
linquency and opportunity to reinstate are not conditions 
precedent to the rights of Appellants to exercise the 
acceleration clause upon default. (36 Am Jur Mtg. 386, 
P. 882 and footnote No. 14; Fed. Land Bank v. Wilmarth, 
218 Iowa 339, 252 NW 507, 94 ALR 1338.) Even a Court of 
Equity cannot enforce generosity. The acceleration clause 
in a note is not a penalty (70 ALR 986), the purchasers 
being required to pay no more on principal by reason of 
exercise of the acceleration clause, and the purchaser 
thereby actually saves substantial interest. The Legisla-
ture has provided elaborate safeguards and redemption 
rights in cases of mortgage foreclosure, which rights will 
all be available to Respondents after this foreclosure is 
decreed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants are entitled to a decree of mortgage fore-
closure since there is no question about the default of 
Respondents in making the contract payments, or the 
right or election of Appellants to declare the entire unpaid 
contract balance immediately due and payable and to 
treat the real estate contract as a note and mortgage. Re-
spondents made no legal tender of the delinquent pay-
ment prior to acceleration of the contract balance and 
there can be no equitable estoppel since the Respondents 
did not change their position to their prejudice in reliance 
upon any acts, omissions or conduct of the Appellants, 
and Appellants had nothing to do with the cause of the 
default. The sole and proximate cause of the default by 
Respondents in making the September, 1962 contract 
payment was and is the lack of funds in Respondent 
Wilcox's bank account which resulted in the check being 
returned marked "Insufficient Funds." It appears that all 
of the talk about arriving at a contract balance and 
suggesting that a tender of delinquent installments would 
be made in the future, if Wilcox was able to sell to Caseys, 
is nothing more than a diversionary tactic, since those 
matters have no relationship to the actual cause of the 
default - the insufficient funds check. 
The decision of the District Court of, no cause of action, 
should be reversed and the case remanded to the District 
Court with instructions to enter judgment of foreclosure 
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of the mortgage, including a reasonable attorney fee for 
services in connection with the foreclosure of the mort-
gage and this appeal, as provided in paragraph 21 of said 
contract (Ex. 1-P). 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
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